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Since their beginnings in 1859 with a crew race between Harvard and 
Yale, intercollegiate athletics have been central to the mythology of American 
universities. Varsity football dominates the fall social calendar of student life; 
“homecoming,” timed to coincide with an important football game, evokes 
alumni nostalgia. Winter is the season for varsity basketball, culminating in 
the National Collegiate Athletic Association (NCAA) national championship 
tournaments in early spring. Until quite recently, the participants in intercollegiate 
varsity sports were nearly all men.
The entry of women competitors into the apparently glorious haze of 
intercollegiate athletics has been belated and awkward. With the passage of Title 
IX in 1972, universities were required to provide equal opportunity in all of their 
federally funded programs. Most moved quickly to establish varsity sports teams 
for women in numbers roughly equal to their offerings for men. The near similarity 
in numbers of teams, however, belies important continuing differences. Football 
remains a major source of attention, revenue, and expenditure. Men’s basketball 
is also a high-profile activity; women’s basketball, particularly with the NCAA 
tournament and television exposure, recently has taken some steps towards suc­
cess on the male model. In nonrevenue sports, from skiing and ice hockey to 
swimming and water polo, although teams are fielded in roughly equal numbers, 
participation and expenditure rates remain higher for men, in ratios that far exceed 
the proportions of men in overall enrollments.
The rosy glow of college athletics, perhaps always exaggerated, has been 
fading of late. Even football is a losing proposition on most campuses. Sperber 
(27), Thelin (29), and others report mismanagement, overexpenditure, and corrup­
tion. The National Collegiate Athletic Association, the private body that regulates 
intercollegiate athletics, has been criticized for behaving as an economic cartel 
by Fleisher, Goff, and Tollison (8), Hart-Nibbrig and Cottingham (11), and 
Lawrence (13), among others. Colleges are rebuked for exploiting, not educating 
athletes; premier athletes themselves exit early, in increasingly greater numbers, 
to professional opportunities. Faculties and even university presidents seek, with 
uneven success, to establish greater control over intercollegiate athletics. As 
universities confront shrinking academic budgets, athletics expenditures, often 
more than 5% of the institution’s total, are viewed with mounting concern (30). 
Universities are urged to sell off their money-making sports teams as separate 
businesses and to abolish the remainder, leaving only intramural activities that
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all can enjoy. Older and working students may view intercollegiate athletics as 
part of a romanticized past that never really was and may resent the dedication 
of large proportions of student fees to their continued support.
Given this critical picture of the current state of intercollegiate competitive 
sports, there is something of a paradox to women’s claims for equal participation. 
These claims might be viewed as efforts to participate in a practice that is 
morally problematic on many counts—that is perhaps bad for, and most likely 
not beneficial for, participants; bad for their fellow students and the universities; 
and bad for society in general. If intercollegiate athletics in their current state 
are indeed an activity that universities should discourage, radically alter, or even 
eliminate, how should claims to equality on behalf of women be evaluated? In 
this paper, I take women’s athletics as a problem about the morality of affirmative 
action within a social practice that is significantly morally flawed. I argue that 
within such a context, the case for affirmative action is limited but powerful, at 
least until there are serious social efforts to improve or eliminate the flawed 
social practice. I begin with an assessment of the case to be made for the current 
practice of intercollegiate athletic competition.
I. Why Intercollegiate Athletic Competition?
Since Greek times at least, sports have been thought to be an important 
part of the process of education. Athletic endeavors, it has been argued, promote 
discipline and health. They clear the mind for other learning, it is said. For 
women, athletic participation may also be important in counteracting historical 
images of weakness and passivity. If this or a similar paean to the educational 
glory of sports is to be believed, then there are arguments for physical education, 
health, and intramural sports activities on university campuses. Arguments for 
the general educational importance of athletics, however, do not necessarily 
provide support for intercollegiate competition. Indeed, if the development of 
intercollegiate competition draws money and enthusiasm away from more wide­
spread participation in sports, education and intercollegiate sports may come 
into conflict. The critical analysis that follows is aimed at intercollegiate sports 
competition of the kind found in schools offering athletic scholarships, not at 
the general educational value of sport or at the intramural or club programs open 
to the entire student body.'
Universities typically offer both intrinsic and instrumental arguments for 
the promotion of intercollegiate varsity competition. Some arguments are based 
on the value of the activity itself to those involved. Athletics on the competitive 
level, it is said, develop skills and self-discipline to the highest degree possible 
for those participating. Team sports encourage cooperation and develop friend­
ships. For many, competitive sports are an enjoyable, even a thrilling, activity. 
Without further support, however, these arguments do not explain why universi­
ties ought to provide such intrinsically valuable activities. Skill development and 
teamwork surely can be learned outside the university; and there are many 
valued activities, from good parties to good horse racing, that universities are not 
generally expected to offer. More complete defenses of intercollegiate competition 
rely either on the benefits it provides to athletes—benefits which are thought in 
some way to be relevant to the educational function of the university—or on 
overall benefits to the university as an institution.
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One quite traditional, and perhaps rather quaint, argument for intercollegiate 
competition is that it develops character traits in athletes—and, by example, in 
other students—in a way appropriate to the function of the university. The ‘ ‘Battle 
of Waterloo was won on the playing fields of Eton,” the Duke of Wellington 
once opined.2 Some recent empirical work by sociologists, however, questions 
whether the kinds of character traits that are developed in intercollegiate competi­
tive athletes today are appropriate sequelae of a liberal education. Chu (4) and 
Stevenson (28) report data suggesting that as athletes become more successful, 
they increasingly value winning rather than fair play, and that coaches tend to 
model authoritarian rather than autonomous behavior patterns. Both the focus 
on winning for its own sake, and the authoritarian coaching behavior might seem 
to be at odds with the values of a liberal education.
An argument that relies heavily on the social role of the modem university 
is that intercollegiate athletics are a source of upward mobility for otherwise 
disadvantaged participants. Varsity athletes receive scholarships and academic 
support that often are not generally available to other students. Premier athletes 
may parlay their college success into lucrative professional athletic careers. The 
experience of intercollegiate competition may also prove a useful basis for job 
opportunities more generally. Unfortunately, the data indicate that these claims 
are unjustifiably optimistic. Although varsity athletes do receive scholarships 
and other support, Purdy, Eitzen, and Hufnagel (23) report that graduation rates 
are low, particularly for minority students in the sports of football and basketball. 
Women athletes graduate in rates comparable to rates of students overall, but 
the picture is worsening for women playing basketball as their sport becomes 
increasingly successful and emulates the model of a male, revenue-earning sport. 
Dubois’s (6) study of post competition occupations of male varsity athletes in 
comparison to occupations of male students who did not participate in varsity 
sports shows no advantage for the athletes, whether white or minority. Intercolle­
giate sports have also been argued to be an important source of opportunities in 
professional sports. College football and basketball serve to some extent as a 
farm system for the professional leagues, although professional opportunities are 
limited. For women, there are few professional sports opportunities, and even 
fewer lucrative possibilities. If increasing numbers of women are well trained in 
college competition, however, perhaps they will become a source of pressures 
for changes in professional sports. Thus the desirability of pressures for increased 
professional athletic opportunities for women might be an argument for increased 
opportunities on the university level.
Another argument for varsity competition is the positive contribution it 
makes to attitudes towards athletes. Successful competition may be a source of 
self-esteem for the athletes themselves. Competition may also help change atti­
tudes towards historically underappreciated groups. Both university and profes­
sional sports have been important forums for the admiration of minority male 
athletes. Female sports heroes such as Jackie Joyner Kersee have also emerged 
from the college ranks into professional and Olympic competition. They are 
exemplars of achievement and strength, rather than weakness and passivity. If 
intercollegiate competition contributes to changes in attitudes towards women 
and minorities, it is arguably linked to the social role of the university in opening 
opportunities for underrepresented groups in society and should be supported on 
that ground.
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Intercollegiate athletics are also thought to be of significant instrumental 
benefit for universities. The “big game” is part of the mythology of campus 
life. Defenders of intercollegiate competition argue that winning sports teams 
gamer respect for the institution, encourage better potential students to apply, 
and augment alumni donations. One recent survey of the data (30) suggests that 
this optimism is not borne out. Evidence for the contention that successful 
teams increase alumni gifts is very mixed. Contributions to booster clubs go to 
underwrite athletics rather than to bolster academic budgets. In a few cases, the 
investment in revenue-producing sports is profitable; in most schools, however, 
even high-profile sports are a losing proposition. In the end, claims that intercolle­
giate athletics contribute to an overall aura of institutional success are very 
difficult to pin down.
Finally, defenders of intercollegiate sports competition argue that it fosters 
university identification and community. Students, who may lead very fragmented 
and separate lives, come together to cheer on their teams. They are joined by 
alumni reliving their loyalties to alma mater. Members of the local community 
may also identify with university sports teams and town-gown conflicts may thus 
be mitigated (4). Sports are a “ safe” vehicle for affiliation, cutting across at 
least some religious, cultural, racial, and generational lines, and even linking 
students with alumni and members of the local community. Chu (4: p. 162) has 
argued that students who attend university athletic events are more likely to be 
involved with the institution in other ways, although the study does not indicate 
whether these are dependent or independent variables. Even so, however, overall 
student community might be fostered more successfully by an intense intramural 
system such as the one in place at the University of California at Davis. When 
they attract visitors from afar, university athletic events surely bring money into 
local businesses; but there may be other, more successful ways for universities 
to contribute to local economies.
The case for intercollegiate competition on its current scale is thus tenuous. 
The best case that can be made for the current practice of intercollegiate sports 
is that they are sought after by their participants and may open opportunities for 
them, although the empirical evidence in support of this is slim. Varsity competi­
tion may also contribute to changed social perceptions of women and minorities, 
and to an enhanced sense of university community. Many continue to believe 
that, despite their flaws, university intercollegiate sports make important contribu­
tions to institutional glory and community, besides being just plain fun. At the 
same time, others charge that varsity competition exploits athletes, drains revenue, 
and detracts from the educational programs of the university. Efforts to remedy 
discrimination against women and minorities in university athletics thus take 
place against a background of at best mixed support for the enterprise generally.
II. Title IX and University Athletics
Enacted in 1972, Title IX3 prohibits discrimination in any educational 
program or activity receiving federal financial assistance. In part because of 
debates about Title IX ’s impact on athletics, universities were given six years 
from its adoption to develop compliance programs. Despite the phase in, Title 
IX was met with resistance from coaches of men’s teams, from university athletics 
directors, and from the National Collegiate Athletic Association. For example,
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the athletic director of the University of Maryland told a congressional subcom­
mittee in 1975 that his department stood in staunch opposition to women’s varsity 
sports because they did not want to market an inferior product (30). The NCAA 
lobbied Congress to exempt athletics from Title IX, and, when this effort failed, 
brought suit challenging the regulations issued by the Department of Health, 
Education, and Welfare (HEW) to implement Title IX .4
At the time Title IX was enacted, university athletic programs were heavily 
dominated by men’s varsity sports. With the impetus of Title IX, many universities 
moved quickly to add a number of women’s varsity teams. By the late 1970s, 
the typical pattern was for a university to offer roughly equal numbers of men’s 
and women’s teams in nonrevenue sports, men’s and women’s basketball teams, 
and a football team. Football of course consumed—and, in at least a few cases, 
produced—immense amounts of revenue. But differences persisted in the patterns 
of participation in, and support for, other men’s and women’s varsity teams. In 
1985, the percentage of athletic budgets devoted to women’s sports in Division 
I schools offering football was 12%; in nonfootball Division I schools, it was 
23% (4: p. 103). Although expenses for women’s sports rose after implementation 
of Title IX, Chu (4) reports that expenses for men’s sports also rose by multiples 
of two to five times as much at different institutions during the same period. As 
late as 1993, NCAA (19) statistics indicate that only 34.8% of varsity university 
athletes were women, up from 31.3% in the 1984-85 academic year. In 1992, 
the NCAA (19) reported that only 30% of athletic scholarship money, 23% of 
operating dollars, and 17% of recruitment funds went to women. Nationally, the 
NCAA (19) calculated that the most frequently offered women’s sport was 
basketball (289 schools; 3,873 athletes) and the sport with the most female 
participants was outdoor track (249 schools; 6,250 athletes). At individual institu­
tions, participation rates over the entire period since the enactment of Title IX 
have departed noticeably from enrollment rates. At the University of Illinois in 
the Big Ten Conference, for example, although 56% of the student body was 
male, over 75% of the varsity athletes (including football players) were male.5 
Pieronek (20) reports that these rates were typical in the Big Ten Conference, 
which in 1992 proposed to require a proportion of at least 40% female athletes 
by 1997. At Colorado State University in the Western Athletic Conference, there 
was a better than 10% disparity in participation rates, a quite low difference by 
national and Big Ten standards, but insufficient for Title IX .6 Moreover, with 
the merger of men’s and women’s programs at many institutions, Acosta and 
Carpenter (1) and Lapchick and Slaughter (12) have reported that the number 
of women coaches and women athletics administrators has dwindled.
By the early 1980s, over 100 Title IX challenges to gender differences in 
university athletics had been filed with the Office of Civil Rights of the Depart­
ment of Education (32). In 1984, however, the United States Supreme Court held 
that Title IX applied only to specific program(s) receiving federal funding, rather 
than to entire institutions.7 Because university athletics programs rarely received 
federal funding on their own, this holding largely deflated the Title IX challenges 
to them. In 1988, however, the program-specific interpretation of Title IX was 
superseded by Congress in the Civil Rights Restoration Act.8
Since 1988, a new set of Title IX complaints has been brought against 
university athletics programs, by both male and female athletes. These complaints 
have forced courts to rule directly on what is meant by nondiscrimination in
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athletics programs under Title IX and, ultimately, to confront difficult ethical 
questions about the meaning of equal opportunity in university athletics.
The renewed ability to challenge athletics programs under Title IX coin­
cided with a period of significant retrenchment in university athletics budgets 
specifically and university budgets more generally. Much of the Title IX 
litigation was instigated by athletes seeking to block their schools from drop­
ping their chosen sports. Female members of varsity teams objected to cutbacks 
that eliminated the teams in equal numbers for both sexes. Male members 
protested cutbacks that were imposed unilaterally on men’s teams. In several 
other cases, women members of club teams sought to compel their university 
to upgrade their teams to varsity status, a step that the university was unwilling 
to take for financial reasons.
Judicial analyses of these Title IX claims have followed a pattern set out 
in the federal regulations and interpretive policy manuals.9 Athletics programs 
must not discriminate in awarding financial aid—although they may structure 
awards differently for separate male and female teams provided that reasonable 
and proportional aid is available for each.10 Second, programs must provide equal 
opportunity in a range of important supportive services: equipment, practice 
times, travel and per diem allowances, coaching and tutoring, locker rooms, 
medical and training facilities, housing and dining services, and publicity. Finally, 
programs must offer a “selection of sports and levels of competition [that] 
effectively accommodate[s] the interests and abilities of members of both 
sexes.” " Relying on a policy interpretation issued by the Office of Civil Rights 
of the Department of Education,12 courts have developed a three-prong test for 
effective accommodation of the interests of a sex that has been underserved 
historically in an athletic program: universities must offer varsity opportunities in 
proportion to representation in the student body; or, universities must demonstrate 
continuing progress in adding opportunities for the underserved sex; or, universi­
ties must demonstrate the interests and abilities of the underserved sex are in 
fact fully met.
This structure of analysis reflects an uneasy compromise between exactly 
equal levels of participation and the historical differences between men’s and 
women’s sports. First, it allows football to remain a sport apart, as long as there 
is equal opportunity in the program overall, by allowing separate teams in contact 
sports, along with separate scholarship and revenue functions for those teams. 
Second, this analysis also permits ongoing, quite large differences between per­
centages of participation by sex in varsity sports and percentages in the overall 
student body, that is, if the university can bear the burden of proving that existing 
interests and abilities are met for the underrepresented sex. This allowance, too, 
is important to the perpetuation of large football programs.
On the other hand, where there are ongoing disproportionalities between 
participation rates and the student body, the university will be virtually compelled 
to accede to demands by women for a sport to be upgraded, or for a sport to be 
protected from cuts. In the view of the Department of Education (32),
Institutions where women are currently underrepresented in the athletics program 
will have a difficult time maintaining compliance with Title IX while eliminating 
women’s teams unless they make comparable cuts, and, in some cases, deeper cuts 
in the men’s program. . . . Institutions that plan to eliminate the same number of
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sports for men and women may also have compliance problems if women are
already underrepresented in the athletics program.
Women ice hockey players, for example, obtained a court order in line 
with this analysis, compelling Colgate University to upgrade their club team to 
varsity status, against a background of differential participation in varsity sports 
by women and men.13 Women gymnasts and field hockey players at Indiana 
University of Pennsylvania successfully fought elimination of their varsity teams 
(in tandem with the elimination of men’s tennis and soccer), despite a university 
proposal to replace them with women’s soccer.14 At Colorado State University, 
women blocked the elimination of fast-pitch softball;15 at Brown University, they 
fought off cuts in women’s gymnastics and volleyball.16 On the other side, male 
athletes have not found Title IX a particular ally in their efforts to stall cuts, 
even when the counterpart women’s team was spared. Male swimmers at the 
University of Illinois, for example, failed in a challenge to their team’s elimination 
despite the continuation of the women’s team, because the Illinois athletics 
programs were predominately (75%) male.17
Thus as Title IX is currently implemented, unless a university provides 
varsity opportunities in proportion to enrollments (which schools fielding football 
teams are unlikely to do), women’s varsity sports are virtually guaranteed protec­
tion when women express interest in varsity competition. This bottom line has 
been characterized by Thro and Snow (31) as a form of affirmative action and 
criticized as an unfair burden on straitened athletics budgets. A quick but facile 
reply to this criticism is that universities can do much to end participation rates 
that are disproportional to enrollments by cutting football rosters.18 A deeper set 
of concerns is prompted by the observation that mandated varsity teams may be 
quite expensive yet benefit only the few athletes who participate in them. Pieronek 
(20) estimates that in order to achieve proportionality with enrollments but still 
leave men’s varsity sports untouched, universities would need to add on average 
six sports (and 128 varsity spaces) for women. Is Title IX, as currently interpreted 
to barter football for women’s varsity teams, a desirable model for equality in 
athletics? Is it an example of affirmative action at all, much less of justifiable 
affirmative action? Should universities cut football, cut other men’s sports, or 
add women’s sports? Should revenues from football, when football is profit- 
making, be dedicated to football or be used to underwrite the remainder of the 
academic program?19 Would models of equality that require major changes in 
the organization of intercollegiate athletics be morally preferable within the 
current context?
III. Affirmative Action in University Athletics
The term affirmative action encompasses a wide range of positive steps 
that might be taken in response to discrimination.20 In university athletics, in 
addition to the provision of varsity sports opportunities for women, affirmative 
action might include efforts to evoke women’s interest and develop their skills, 
to encourage intramural participation by more women, to form coeducational 
teams, and even to reassess the entire way that intercollegiate competition is 
structured and understood. In comparison, affirmative action in employment has
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ranged from reassessment of frankly biased selection criteria, to job training and 
recruitment, to redefinition of entire job categories.
I have argued elsewhere (10) that the case for affirmative action in education 
can be made on at least three different moral grounds. Affirmative action may 
be used to compensate identified victims of past injustices; the creation of remedial 
programs for individuals who have been unjustly denied opportunities is an 
example. In athletics, Lapchick and Slaughter (12) suggest the example of provid­
ing enhanced scholarship opportunities for women who have been discriminato­
rily denied them. It may serve to correct ongoing discrimination; faculty 
recruitment or hiring goals may be required when patterns of selection indicate 
subjective, difficult-to-eradicate bias. An example here might be the recruitment 
of more women coaches and athletic administrators. A third moral justification 
for affirmative action is that it may be a method for improving overall distributive 
justice in society. The United States Supreme Court had held, however, that a 
concern for social justice is not a legally compelling interest that can justify the 
state’s use of reverse racial preferences in such areas as government contracts.21 
Nonetheless, educational diversity may remain a legally compelling state interest 
that justifies university consideration of multiple factors, including race, in making 
admissions decisions.22 An example from athletics might be increasing participa­
tion by women to further the likely development of women’s opportunities in 
professional sports.
These arguments for affirmative action typically are made within contexts 
in which the activity at issue is thought to be worthwhile both to the individuals 
seeking increased access and to society more generally. Compensatory affirmative 
action gives victims something of value, such as a training opportunity. Moral 
objections to compensatory affirmative action generally rest on the claims of 
others to the means of compensation, such as admission to a training program, 
or on whether the source from which compensation is sought is any way responsi­
ble for the past victimization, not on whether the means of compensation is itself 
a good. Corrective affirmative action roots out continuing bias in order, it is 
hoped, that everyone is treated fairly. Here, the chief moral objection lies not 
with what is being distributed, but with the risk that affirmative action will 
introduce new forms of bias. Redistributive affirmative action aims to move 
society towards more just distribution of the benefits and burdens of social living. 
Here, too, objections that affirmative action is unjust rest on who wins and loses 
under the change and why and how they lose, rather than on whether it is a good 
thing for anyone at all to experience the benefits being redistributed.23
What happens to these justifications for affirmative action if an historically 
disadvantaged group seeks fuller participation in an activity that is socially 
problematic or that should be reduced or eliminated for good social reasons? If 
criticisms of the current practice of university athletics are to be believed, this 
is the problem posed by affirmative action for women in intercollegiate varsity 
competition. I will argue here that the case for affirmative action is limited, but 
not entirely vitiated, under such circumstances. Moreover, how the case is changed 
depends on the nature of the reasons for discouraging the activity; several im­
portantly different reasons are that it is risky to participating individuals, that it 
is costly but unlikely to yield any benefits to participants, or that it has undesirable 
consequences for others in society.
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First, take activities that are risky to participants. Such risks have been 
offered as objections to including women in high-injury or high-stress sports.24 
They may be at least part of the explanation for the continued accommodation 
of separate teams for men and women in contact sports.25 Risks to participants 
are, however, unjust reasons for exclusion, so long as the activity is left open to 
men. Medical experiments with human subjects are an illuminating analogy.26 
Some experiments simply are not permitted by federal regulations because their 
risks outweigh their potential benefits. Researchers may not enter any subjects in 
such experiments, even with the subjects’ informed consent. In medical research, 
however, there has been a long-standing practice of routinely excluding women 
from experiments, allegedly because of the risks of pregnancy or the need for a 
uniform subject population. This exclusion has been criticized as unwarranted 
paternalism, because it substitutes the experimenter’s risk judgments for the 
judgments of the excluded group of women subjects, but not for the included 
men subjects. It thus continues stereotypes of women as less capable of responsible 
decision-making. Moreover, as Merton (15) and others have argued, the insistence 
on exclusion to ensure a uniform patient population is misguided because it 
significantly limits the information that is available about the responses of women 
to new medical therapies and limits women’s access to the therapies themselves 
in their developmental stages. The National Institutes of Health (NIH) have 
recently issued policy guidelines requiring equal participation of women in studies 
it sponsors and analysis of relevant differences in results by gender, unless there 
is a compelling justification to the contrary. Thus, in medical research, affirmative 
action has not been required when experiments are prohibited across the board, 
but is demanded when a study is open to men but not to women. Applying this 
analogy to sports, the conclusion would be that universities may decide that some 
sports are too risky to offer at all, but not that their risks warrant limiting them 
to men.
A second concern about the assumption that it is desirable to increase 
opportunities for varsity competition is that there is little evidence that such 
competition benefits participants with increased educational or job opportunities. 
This lack of evidence at least undercuts the argument that affirmative action in 
women’s varsity athletics will give more women these benefits and thus increase 
overall social justice. The fact remains, however, that Title IX only requires a 
university to protect women’s varsity sports when its athletic program is dispro­
portionate, when it has not made continued progress towards improvement, or 
when there is unmet need among able women competitors. A university can 
avoid a Title IX order if it can show that there is insufficient interest or ability 
to field a given women’s team. Nonetheless, a university with a problematic 
history will need to respond to expressions of women’s interest despite a lack 
of evidence that the women will ultimately benefit. Such universities will be 
ordered to make quite substantial expenditures because a few women want the 
opportunities. In times of tight budgets, there is something unfortunate about 
costly expenditures that respond to the desires of a few. This argument could be 
the basis for the elimination of all varsity sports that respond principally to the 
interests of their participants—all of what might be called “vanity” sports. The 
trouble with applying this argument to the present situation, however, is that 
universities continue to offer at least some low-interest varsity sports for both 
men and women. As long as universities continue the pattern of funding for
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“vanity” sports, it is wrong for them to offer this desired benefit disproportion­
ately to men. Title IX ’s requirements are therefore justified. At the same time, 
it might be preferable from the point of view of justice to eliminate all “vanity” 
programs and spend the money saved on more important opportunities for a 
larger group of students such as intramural sports, an issue to which I shall return 
in the final section.
Universities opting to eliminate all intercollegiate competition in “vanity” 
sports, however, would also confront the problem of whether they could choose, 
legally or ethically, to retain football as a revenue-producing sport.28 Under current 
legal standards, they probably could not make this choice; although Title IX 
permits differently structured and financed programs, it also requires that there 
be equal accommodation of the interests of women athletes, including provision 
of teams at competitive levels and efforts to develop women’s teams as revenue- 
producers on the model of men’s teams. It would also be ethically troublesome 
to retain football while abolishing the remainder of the intercollegiate program 
for both men and women. This choice would leave the university with a high- 
profile, highly sought after (albeit most likely not beneficial) showcase for male 
athletes, with no comparable opportunities for women. An alternative might be 
to take up the suggestion of critics of university athletics that some allegedly 
profitable sports enterprises be privatized.
Finally, what are the consequences for affirmative action if the activity to 
which increased entry is sought is one that there are good social reasons for 
discouraging entirely? As the initial section of this paper argued, intercollegiate 
athletic competition might well fall into this category because it is expensive, 
provides little or no educational benefit, and may foster problematic images of 
excellence and fair play. If society is genuinely discouraging the activity, then 
the argument for affirmative action would be undercut. But if society is not 
working to discourage the activity, the case for affirmative action remains. It is 
worse from the point of view of justice to continue sponsoring the activity, but 
leave women out, than to sponsor it without women. It is worse still if one of 
the concerns about the activity is that it contributes to problematic images of 
women or other disadvantaged groups. Thus even if it would be best overall to 
phase out intercollegiate athletic competition, it is better to make serious efforts 
to include women, even if they increase the resources committed to the enterprise, 
than to continue it with disproportionate participation by men. In short, universi­
ties that stick with football are stuck with Title IX.
There are, to be sure, moral difficulties with phasing out intercollegiate 
competition, just as there are with phasing out any cherished benefit. Athletes, 
both male and female, have been recruited with promises of scholarships and 
competition. They have what I have argued elsewhere (9) might be viewed as 
legitimate expectations that these opportunities will continue during their time 
as students; at least, they have been encouraged to form these expectations by 
those providing the benefits—they have had no reason to believe the assurances 
were dubious or that they themselves were benefiting as perpetrators of injustice. 
These expectations might be the basis for constructing a phase-out so as to 
cushion the impact on present athletes, while not creating a new set of expectations 
for incoming students. Recruited athletes might, for example, be able to keep 
their scholarships for four years; or, universities might continue to field competi­
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tive teams at least through the junior years of recruited athletes in sports slated 
for discontinuation.
Phase-outs such as the abolition of all or most “ vanity” sports face tremen­
dously difficult issues of coordination, however. Unless all of the schools within 
a conference—or, perhaps, within a region—adopt similar phase-out strategies, 
athletes recruited by one school will find themselves left out, while athletes at 
other schools will continue to compete. They may well believe that they have 
been treated unfairly by their own schools. While they have no entitlement to 
continue to compete, and of course are free to transfer, it is true that they are 
losing a cherished benefit that others just like them continue to enjoy. The 
situation is perhaps worst when a men’s sport is cancelled and women at the 
same school continue to enjoy the opportunity to compete in that sport.29 The 
alternative that avoids the apparent unfairness of differential treatment of athletes 
with similar expectations is to continue to provide the competitive opportunity 
until a coordinated system of cuts is in place. Athletes already recruited could 
continue to enjoy their sport until it was gradually phased down in a coordinated 
way, and new recruitment efforts would cease. Such coordination strategies are 
difficult to implement, however, because as Fleisher, Goff, and Tollison (8) 
argue, individual athletic departments have incentives to keep their budgets as 
large as possible. Thus the fairest of the likely outcomes is to continue to support 
men’s “vanity” sports, while increasing support for women’s sports—an outcome 
that is expensive and that may lead universities in the long run to reconsider the 
wisdom of their support for intercollegiate competition.
IV. Beyond the Title IX Model of Equality
The strong protection given women’s varsity sports by Title IX is thus justified 
despite—and perhaps even because of—the flaws of the current system of competi­
tion. A better alternative, however, might be to consider ways of radically restructur­
ing intercollegiate athletic competition. In this concluding section, I explore four 
possibilities for reconstruction and argue that all are preferable, from the point of 
view of justice, to affirmative action within the current context.30 None, however, 
are explicitly supported by the current interpretation of Title IX.
First, universities might increase efforts to encourage women to participate 
in skills training and sports activities. If women’s historical underrepresentation 
in competitive athletics is in part a result of earlier educational programs and 
attitudes that discourage them from participating in athletics at all, such efforts 
are an important form of affirmative action. Because the aim would be to increase 
exposure to a real benefit, the focus of such encouragement would be fitness 
and skills activities that are of lifelong importance and simply not short-term 
competitive opportunities. An analogy might be the programs at many universities 
to increase interest and training in science and mathematics among women and 
minority students. The focus of the Title IX regulations, however, is the provision 
of levels of competition that “effectively accommodate the interests and abilities 
of members of both sexes.”31
A second initiative for universities might be the development of intramural 
sports programs that expand participation and competition widely throughout the 
student body. A typical pattern at universities today is the contrast between 
lavish support for varsity athletics and little support for intramural activities.
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An alternative would be to improve intramural facilities, to make educational 
opportunities (such as skills training) available in conjunction with them, and to 
increase the amenities associated with them. The University of California at 
Davis is an example of how widespread intramural programs can help to develop 
a sense of community among students. While Title IX  requires the provision of 
appropriate levels of competition at all levels, including the intramural level, its 
emphasis, as it has been interpreted in litigation, has been varsity teams, not the 
overall expansion of athletic participation across the student body.
A more radical option might be the reconsideration of what are considered 
sports. Sports today emphasize physical characteristics such as bulk (football) 
and height (basketball)— characteristics that are predominately male— rather than 
characteristics such as finesse, agility, or endurance. Women athletes confront 
what Martha Minow (16) has called the “ difference dilemma” : either they play 
by historical rules, which fail to acknowledge differences between women and 
men, or they are stigmatized for calling attention to differences. Women basketball 
players, for example, have moved into a sport constructed for tall bodies. Although 
they have in many respects been successful in constructing a different kind 
of sport— one that emphasizes ball movement, for example— they might have 
constructed an even more exciting sport had basket height or angle been adjusted. 
Nonetheless, there have been some encouraging signs in the direction of changed 
sports emphases. For example, women’s soccer has become far more popular, 
as have endurance track events such as the marathon for women. Gymnastics 
tests different skills for men and women; women’s gymnastics has become a 
popular sport on some campuses, although sometimes one that advertises based 
on the sexuality of the women athletes involved. Title IX , as it has been interpreted, 
however, does not require implementation of new sports for women, except in 
response to demand; it may even be an obstacle to new sports to the extent that 
it protects established ones.32 Moreover, there is no mandate in Title IX  for the 
identification or development of entirely new sports.
Finally, university sports programs might consider the introduction of coed­
ucational teams. Such teams are of course a mainstay of recreational and intramu­
ral programs. They emphasize teamwork and complementary skills— both 
characteristics that are arguably beneficial and useful educationally. Such team­
work opportunities might also be highly useful in acculturating women and men 
to work together in other contexts, especially if the opportunities are spread 
widely throughout the student body. Yet no intercollegiate competition today 
features coeducational teams, although parallel teams are fielded in such sports 
as tennis, swimming, diving, track, golf, and skiing. Even mixed doubles, a staple 
of both professional and recreational tennis, is ignored on the college level. 
Title IX  accepts the separation of men’s and women’s teams outright, with one 
exception: in noncontact sports in which no team is fielded for the underrepre­
sented sex, members of the excluded sex must be permitted to try out on a skills 
basis for the team of the other sex.33
V. Conclusion
In this article, I have argued that university athletics for women should be 
treated as a case of affirmative action within a morally flawed practice. So long 
as the practice continues in its present form, the case for affirmative action
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remains. But there is a stronger case to be made for radical changes in the current 
practice. Title IX , the statute requiring equality in federally funded educational 
programs, does not propose such radical changes and may even in some contexts 
be a roadblock to them.34
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